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Stochastic Strategy Adjustment in Coordination Games
Abstract
The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an
infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of
playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that agents follow a rule of `switching to better strategies
with higher probability'. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal
(1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate
with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination
game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic but
instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs
with probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the
spatial distribution of these agents.
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1. Introduction
The seminal work of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), henceforth denoted as KMR, and
Young (1993) has attracted much interest in evolutionary models of equilibrium selection
in coordination games. Subsequent models have refined this work by introducing local
interaction [e.g., Ellison (1993), Blume (1993, 1995)], or by enlarging the strategy space
of an agent [Ely (1995), Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997), Kim and Sobel (1995)]. The
present paper belongs to the first category in featuring local interaction. It follows a new
line in studying alternative ideas for modeling the individual behavior of an agent.
The common story in the evolutionary approach is that there is a large population of
agents, each facing a situation of repeated interaction with other agents. The interaction
is modeled as a symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game where agents are restricted to pure
strategies. The evolution of play within the population is driven by the assumption that
agents may switch strategies. Since opponents may change their strategy, too, each agent
repeatedly plays the coordination game against a changing mixture of strategies. An agent’s
task is to adjust his strategy to the environment he faces.
The original assumption of KMR (1993) and Young (1993) is that agents adjust their
strategy by playing perturbed best-response. With high probability they play a best response
to their environment, with remaining low probability they simply play random. The first
part is based on the idea that agents are influenced by payoff differences, the second part
captures noisy behavior and models, e.g., individual mistakes or deliberate experimentation
of an agent. Based on this assumption, the surprisingly strong result is that evolution selects
the risk-dominant equilibrium as defined by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).1
Perhaps the strongest objection to this result has been put forward by Bergin and
Lipman (1996), who show that the equilibrium selection result is based on the specific
assumption that random play is sufficiently similar in different states of the process. In
fact, they prove that, if one allows the noise rate to depend on the state of the process then
every invariant distribution of the noiseless process and thus every strict Nash equilibrium
of the coordination game can be selected.2
One possible way to proceed is to analyze the noise element explicitly, by modeling its
economic, social, or psychological source. A recent approach in this direction is van Damme
1Papers in the second category mentioned above obtain the payoff-dominant equilibrium, which is a
result that follows directly from the enlargement of the strategy space. See also Section 11 of this paper.
2Blume (1994) argues in a similar way. He analyzes different versions of noise in order to find criteria
for invariance of the selection result with respect to the noise process.
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and Weibull (1998), who consider agents who rationally choose to make mistakes because it
is too costly to avoid these mistakes completely. The resulting endogenous noise rates are
shown to be sufficiently similar across states, which establishes the result of risk dominance.
An alternative is to leave the paradigm of perturbed best-response behavior and choose a
different model for agents’ adjustment, which nonetheless features important properties of
the original approach. This is the way we proceed in this paper.
Intuitively speaking, pure best-response adjustment says: adjust to best strategies with
probability one. This holds true even if the other strategy earns only infinitesimally larger
payoffs. Hence adjustment is very payoff-sensitive and in fact deterministic. At any time
an agent’s probability to change his strategy is either one if the other strategy is a best
response, or zero if not. The starting point of our model is to study a smoothed version
of best-response, which says: adjust to better strategies with higher probability. In a static
framework this simple intuitive idea is related to a model of Rosenthal (1989). It also
resembles much the behavioral notion in proportional imitation as introduced by Schlag
(1998), although we do not consider actual imitation in this model.
The first consequence of our assumption is that the strategy adjustment of an agent
is less payoff-sensitive. Probabilities to switch lie within the whole interval [0, 1] rather
than in the subset {0, 1}. In fact, many times both strategies will be played with positive
probability. This corresponds to the effect of noise in perturbed best-response. However,
the second and main feature of our approach is that agents are still influenced by payoff
differences, which we see as the essence of pure best-response behavior. While the latter
assumes that infinitesimally small payoff differences are weighted in the same way as large
payoff differences, our assumption says that payoff differences matter all the more the larger
they are.
Based on this approach our main results show that agents are more likely to coordinate
on the risk-dominant equilibrium. In this sense our model supports the result of KMR
(1993), Young (1993), and others and qualifies the critique of Bergin and Lipman (1996).
However, in our model, contrary to most other approaches, the risk-dominated equilibrium
still corresponds to an invariant distribution of the stochastic process. This is due to our
assumption that the influence of noise on agents’ behavior vanishes if and only if agents
successfully coordinate on a Nash equilibrium. Therefore the process is not ergodic and,
in fact, basins of attraction of both equilibria are non-empty. Thus, the question on which
equilibrium agents will actually coordinate depends on initial conditions. Note that with
this respect our process shows the same characteristic as pure best-response adjustment.
Nevertheless, we are able to give a clear prediction for equilibrium-selection.
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The model that is perhaps closest to our’s is the ‘log-linear model’ of Blume (1993).
In this model the author studies a situation where the log-odds of an agent choosing one
strategy to another are proportional to the payoff difference between the strategies. The
relationship is parametrized by a constant of proportionality β ∈ IR, where β = 0 cor-
responds to (uniformly distributed) random-choice behavior and β = +∞ corresponds to
pure best-response behavior. Similarly to our model agents live on a n-dimensional lattice
and interact with their nearest neighbors. Blume shows that in 2 × 2 coordination games
the log-linear strategy revision process is ergodic for every β and selects the risk-dominant
equilibrium for β → +∞. Proofs rely on the fact that the log-linear model belongs to the
class of stochastic Ising models.
Our model shares with the model of Blume the idea that probabilities of adjusting
strategies monotonically depend on payoff differences. While Blume studies a logarithmic
relationship we connect probabilities and payoff differences directly. However, the main
difference between the two models concerns the perturbation of an agent’s choice behavior
and, in consequence, also the dynamic behavior of the strategy revision process. Basically
in the log-linear model, noise, parametrized by β, works in a similar way as mutations do
in the model of KMR (1993). At any time, the choice behavior of an agent is perturbed by
noise with the result that the strategy adjustment of all agents is an ergodic process. Then
the influence of noise is reduced and in the limit, when the influence of noise vanishes, one
equilibrium is selected.
In contrast, as we will see, in our model an agent’s choice behavior is not subject to
noise all the time. In fact, the influence of noise completely disappears whenever an agent
successfully coordinates on a strict Nash equilibrium with all his neighbors. Only when
neighbors play different strategies, do agents behave in a noisy (i.e. non-best-response)
fashion in our model. In consequence, the process of strategy adjustment is no longer
ergodic. Both Nash equilibria correspond to invariant distributions. We do not reduce
the influence of noise in our model either. Agents continue making mistakes with positive
probability whenever local play is heterogeneous. Together these assumptions allow us to
discriminate between the two Nash equilibria by showing that convergence to the risk-
dominant equilibrium occurs for a larger class of initial distributions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model of local interaction.
Section 3 introduces the class of coordination games we want to look at. In Section 4
the idea of stochastic strategy adjustment is made precise and our two main behavioral
assumptions are formulated. The relation of these assumptions to other work is given in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the model. Results are obtained and discussed in sections 7
3
to 10. Finally, Section 11 concludes.
2. Local Interaction
Similarly to other models [Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993)] we consider a spatial model
of local interaction. Precisely, we assume an infinite population of agents located on the
n-dimensional integer lattice Zn. The dimension of the lattice can have any value n ≥ 1.
Results in our model do not depend on n. By identifying each agent with his or her location
the space Zn represents the population of agents. Agents are denoted as x, y, z ∈ Zn.
Every agent is assumed to interact with a finite set of other agents, his so-called neigh-
bors. For every agent x ∈ Zn we define the neighborhood to be given by N(x) := {y ∈
Zn| |y − x| = 1} where | · | denotes the Euclidean distance within Zn. Thus, neighbors
are agents who are one step away in exactly one of n dimensions. Sometimes this kind of
neighborhood interaction is also called nearest-neighbor interaction. If n equals 1, neighbors
are located both to the right and to the left of an agent. For n = 2, the set of neighbors
consists, in addition, of those agents that are located above and below an agent. For any
n, every agent has 2n neighbors.
Of course, there are various other possibilities for defining particular neighborhood struc-
tures, even when adhering to the general assumption of an n-dimensional lattice. One could
take, for example, the maximum norm. Then neighbors are all those agents who are at
most one step away in all of the n dimension, and thus every agent has exactly 2n−1 neigh-
bors. Intuition suggests that different structures will lead to different outcomes. Important
research therefore focuses on robustness checks on different neighborhood structures. An
early approach in this direction was made by Ellison (1993) in comparing global with lo-
cal interaction. A recent discussion of general neighborhood structures is given in Morris
(2000) and Young (1998).
Yet, in the present model we restrict our analysis to the nearest neighbor interaction
as defined above. The reason for doing this is simply that this neighborhood structure has
already been studied in other models as well [cf. Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993)]. As
we do not want to focus on the role of the neighborhood structure itself, but rather on
the behavior of agents within such a neighborhood structure, this enables us to relate our
findings to those of others without any confusion about possible differences in underlying
neighborhood structures. Our main contribution will be a robustness check with respect to
an agent’s behavior rather than with respect to the relevant neighborhood structure.
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3. Coordination Games
We consider the class of symmetric 2× 2 coordination games that are given by the payoff
matrix in Figure 1.
Top Bottom
Top a, a c, d
Bottom d, c b, b
Figure 1: Coordination Game
We assume all values to be finite and both, a > d and b > c, hence (Top,Top) and
(Bottom,Bottom) are the two strict Nash equilibria of the game. There exists another
symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where both players put probability b−c
a−d+b−c
on strategy Top. However, we are not going to focus on this equilibrium since we restrict
players to playing pure strategies only.3
Time is continuous in our model. At any time t ∈ IR+0 to each agent x ∈ Zn one of the two
possible actions is assigned: Top, henceforth denoted by T , or Bottom, henceforth denoted
by B. The collection of actions over the whole population at a given time is modeled by
the mapping
ξ : Zn → {T,B} (1)
x 7→ ξ(x),
where ξ(x) denotes the strategy of agent x. The mapping ξ is also called a configuration.
Let Ξ denote the set of all possible configurations. ξt ∈ Ξ denotes the configuration at time
t ∈ IR+0 .
Agents continuously and uniformly interact with their neighbors. We assume that at
any time t each agent is sequentially matched with his 2n neighbors.4 In each single match
the coordination game is played with every agent choosing his assigned action. For agent
x ∈ Zn, let pi(x, ξ) denote the accumulated payoff from these matches when the play of the
population is determined by configuration ξ ∈ Ξ. Thus,
pi(x, ξ) =
∑
y∈N(x)
G
(
ξ(x), ξ(y)
)
, (2)
3Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997) distinguish between cases where d ≥ b and d < b. Games in the
first subclass are called stag-hunt games, games in the second pure coordination games. Our results hold
for both classes.
4We do not model the actual matching procedure but concentrate on accumulated payoffs.
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where G(·, ·) calculates the payoff from the matrix in Figure 1.
4. Stochastic Strategy Adjustment
In this model we pursue the idea that agents stochastically adjust their strategy to a
changing environment given by the play in their local neighborhood. However, we do not
follow the usual approach in the evolutionary literature that studies boundedly rational
behavior by assuming first best-response adjustment which is then perturbed by some form
of noise. Instead, we consider a simple adjustment rule that directly connects probabilities
to switch from one strategy to the other and payoffs of both strategies. In short, the main
assumptions are as follows: agents stick to their strategy given that coordination with their
neighbors is successful (Assumption 1), and agents switch with higher probability if the
other strategy earns relatively higher payoffs (Assumption 2).
Technically, we model the probability of adjusting a strategy by means of so-called flip
rates. These rates are real-valued functions that determine the probability for an agent to
switch (flip) to the other strategy within an infinitesimally short period of time. Denote
r(x, ξt) ∈ [0,∞) the flip rate of agent x ∈ Zn given the state of the population ξt ∈ Ξ. Then
for δ ↓ 0 it holds that
Prob[ξt+δ(x) 6= ξt(x)] = r(x, ξt) · δ + o(δ). (3)
Thus, given the configuration ξt at time t, for infinitesimally short periods of time
the probability for agent x to adjust his strategy within that period from ξt(x) to the
complementary strategy equals the product of the flip rate r(x, ξt) times the length of the
time period.
The next two assumptions form the essence of the adjustment rule that is followed by
each agent in our model.
Assumption 1 (Nash equilibrium) Flip rates are zero if all agents in the neighborhood
coordinate on the same strategy, i.e. agents play a Nash equilibrium. For any x ∈ Zn, ξ ∈ Ξ
r(x, ξ) = 0 ⇔ ∀y ∈ N(x) : ξ(y) = ξ(x). (4)
Assumption 2 (Flips to better strategies are more likely) Flip rates depend on
payoff differences in a linear monotonic way. The higher the relative payoff advantage of a
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strategy the larger the rate to flip to this strategy. There exists a parameter λ, 0 < λ <∞,
such that for any x ∈ Zn, ξ ∈ Ξ
r(x, ξx,B)− r(x, ξx,T ) = λ
(
pi(x, ξx,T )− pi(x, ξx,B)
)
, (5)
where
ξx,s(z) =
 ξ(z) if z 6= xs if z = x, (6)
with s ∈ {T,B}.
Assumption 1 models the idea that individual learning forces are weak at Nash equilibria
of the game. If no single neighboring opponent plays the other strategy, this other strategy
is not a best response to any of the neighbors’ currently played strategy. Hence there is
no reason to play that other strategy. Thus flip rates are zero. In this situation an agent’s
behavior coincides with pure best-response behavior.
Assumption 2 is the important behavioral assumption in our model. It is motivated by
the idea that agents do not react over-sensitively to changes in their local environment by
always adjusting their strategy towards best responses with probability one. Instead, agents
are assumed to follow a rule of adjusting towards better strategies with higher probability.
The larger the payoff difference between the other strategy and the current strategy is,
the more likely agents are to switch. The sensitivity of this reaction is governed by the
parameter λ, which we assume to be finite.5 The larger λ the more sensitive the adjustment
with respect to payoff differences. Since payoffs in the underlying coordination game are
finite as well, flip rates are always finite. This ensures, by (3), that agents are locked in for
infinitesimally short periods of time. During these time periods they are programmed to
their currently chosen strategy.
Note that under Assumption 2 the probability to flip is not necessarily zero whenever
the payoff of the other strategy is less than the one currently being earned. Assumption 1
says that if there is at least one neighbor playing the other strategy, an agent switches to
that strategy with positive probability even if this makes him worse off. Yet, by Assumption
2 it follows that after he has switched to a bad strategy the likelihood of switching back to
the good strategy is always higher than the likelihood of switching was before.
According to our model, the probability that two agents will flip simultaneously is zero.
Hence, individual strategy adjustments are non-synchronized, which allows us to ignore the
effects of simultaneous strategy revision.
5Note that λ = ∞ would correspond to a pure best-response scenario since (3) shows that a flip rate
equal to infinity implies an instantaneous adjustment if the other strategy earns a larger payoff.
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5. Relation to Other Work
In a static framework Rosenthal (1989) has studied an idea similar to our approach. For
general two person games with finite numbers of strategies the author explores a solution
concept where, instead of playing best responses with probability one, players use “better
responses with probabilities not lower than worse responses” [Rosenthal (1989), p274].
Using a notation similar to the present model this idea can be illustrated as follows. Let
pi and pj denote the probabilities with which a player intends to use his strategies i and
j. Let pii and pij denote the payoffs of strategies i and j given some strategy of the other
player. Then Rosenthal assumes that if pi > 0 and pj > 0,
pi − pj = λ(pii − pij), (7)
where λ is a finite parameter playing the same role as in our model. Comparing equation
(7) to our Assumption 2 shows that our model can in fact be seen as a dynamic version
of Rosenthal’s model of boundedly rational behavior. Instead of relating static choice
probabilities to payoff differences we assume that probabilities to change a strategy are
linked to corresponding differences in payoffs.
The idea of Assumption 2 is also closely related to the notion of a proportional imitation
rule as introduced by Schlag (1998). There an imitation rule is called proportional if
the difference in probabilities of switching from strategy i to strategy j and vice versa is
proportional to the payoff difference between strategies i and j. In Schlag’s model, payoffs
are determined via a multi-armed bandit and an agent can learn other strategies and payoffs
by sampling other agents. He then (randomly) decides to imitate, i.e. switch to the other
agent’s strategy, or stay put. This is, of course, different to our model since agents do not
imitate, nor do they observe other agents’ payoffs. Still, given an agent’s information about
his current strategy’s payoff and the payoff of another strategy (be it via sampling or by
own calculation) our main assumptions coincide in the sense that probabilities of switching
are proportional to the difference in payoffs between both strategies.
Without going into further details, the idea of letting probabilities of choosing strategy
depend on payoff differences is also an important assumption in the ‘muddling model’ of
Binmore and Samuelson (1997) and the log-linear model of Blume (1993). For a closer
relation to the latter model see the introduction of this article.
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6. Definition of Flip Rates
In order to implement Assumptions 1 and 2 recall the payoff matrix of the underlying
coordination game (Figure 1). Given a configuration ξ the payoff which agent x earns can
be computed as
pi(x, ξ) =

∑
y∈N(x)
ξ(y)=T
a +
∑
y∈N(x)
ξ(y)=B
c if ξ(x) = T
∑
y∈N(x)
ξ(y)=T
d +
∑
y∈N(x)
ξ(y)=B
b if ξ(x) = B.
(8)
Using notation ξx,T and ξx,B to assign strategy T or B to agent x leaving the rest of
configuration ξ fixed, payoff differences are equal to
pi(x, ξx,T )− pi(x, ξx,B) = (a− d)nT (x, ξ) − (b− c)nB(x, ξ), (9)
where ns(x, ξ) gives the number of agent x’s neighbors, who play strategy s in configuration
ξ.
In view of Assumptions 1 and 2 there are still many ways of defining flip rates, as they
leave some degrees of freedom. The first assumption gives boundary conditions while the
second one fixes relative values only. We will stick to the simplest version possible, in which
flip rates depend linearly on the number of neighbors playing the other strategy.
Definition 1 (Stochastic Strategy Adjustment) For x ∈ Zn and ξ ∈ Ξ,
r(x, ξ) =

λ(a− d)nT (x, ξ) if ξ(x) = B
λ(b− c)nB(x, ξ) if ξ(x) = T,
(10)
where 0 < λ <∞ and a, b, c, d are the payoffs in the coordination game given in Figure 1.
Definition 1 is a clear aggregation of Assumptions 1 and 2. Flip rates for an agent are
zero whenever all neighbors of that agent play the same strategy as he does. For every
configuration the difference between flip rates equals the difference of payoffs times the
sensitivity parameter.
Note that our assumptions imply that every additional neighbor that plays the other
strategy increases the probability of switching to that strategy by some value equal to the
equilibrium payoff of that strategy, and simultaneously decreases the probability by some
value equal to the off-equilibrium payoff of that strategy. The increase can be seen as
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corresponding to chances of earning the equilibrium payoff after a switch to that strategy.
The decrease is related to a simultaneous loss of the off-equilibrium payoff that is currently
earned. In this sense, factors a − d and b − c capture revenue minus opportunity cost of
adjusting from one strategy to the other. Of course, since agents play a coordination game
these terms are always positive. Thus, if there is at least one neighbor playing the other
strategy, the probability of switching to that strategy is positive, as well. However, the
actual likelihood of a switch is determined by the magnitude of these terms.
This suggests that we have to distinguish between two cases, either a − d = b − c or
a − d > b − c.6 In the first case the situation is symmetric. The probability of switching
just depends on the number of neighbors playing the other strategy, equally weighted for
both strategies. In the language of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) this case is equivalent to
saying that both equilibria are equally risky while if a − d > b − c strategy profile (T, T )
is the risk-dominant equilibrium. In our model a − d > b − c implies that we are in
an asymmetric situation, where strategy T is weighted more strongly, which may already
suggest the direction of play within the population. We will restrict attention to this case
for the rest of this paper. However, before we do so, we briefly mention its relation to the
symmetric case.
Using common results from the theory of interacting particle systems [see Liggett (1985)
for a good introduction] it can easily be shown that flip rates in Definition 1 define a unique
Markov process {ξt}t≥0 on the state space of all configurations Ξ. We call this process the
adjustment process. In the symmetric case, where a−d = b−c, the behavior of this process is
equivalent to the behavior of the so-called voter model, which was introduced independently
by Clifford and Sudbury (1973) and Holley and Liggett (1975). In the asymmetric case,
where a − d > b − c, the process is equivalent to the so-called biased voter model. This
process was first considered by Schwartz (1977) and later by Bramson and Griffeath (1980,
1981). Bramson and Griffeath looked for results concerning the evolution of the process
to describe the possible spread of cancerous cells, an approach that was introduced by
Williams and Bjerknes (1972), while Schwartz was interested in the duality theory of a
larger class of Markov processes.
We now turn to an analysis of the evolution of play when agents adjust according to
Definition 1 and a− d > b− c.
6The case a− d < b− c is equivalent to the case a− d > b− c by changing names of the strategies.
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7. Sensitivity Parameter λ
The first observation is that as long as λ is finite its value plays no part in the long-run
behavior (t =∞) of the process.
Proposition 1 For λ <∞ the long-run behavior of the adjustment process is independent
of λ.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the fact that a change of λ simply results in
a change of the time scale and that properties concerning long-run behavior (t = ∞) are
independent of the time scale. 2
In the short and in the medium run the value of λ does, of course, play a big part in the
behavior of the process. For example, the expected number of agents that play strategy T
at any finite time t depends on the actual value of λ. Low values of λ create high inertia
in the adjustment of an agent, while high values speed up the evolution of play. However,
since technically any effects of a change of λ correspond to a rescaling of time, a change
has no qualitative implications. Convergence is the same for every finite λ.7 Since we will
focus on long-run behavior, λ is henceforth normalized to 1.
8. Clustering
One of the most important problems is, of course, the characterization of the set of invariant
distributions of the adjustment process {ξt}t≥0, since these will be the only possible limiting
distributions for the process. Obviously, the prominent measures νB and νT that correspond
to the strict Nash equilibria (B,B) and (T, T ), concentrating on the states where everybody
plays B (denoted as B) and everybody plays T (denoted as T) respectively, are both
invariant. So the process will never be ergodic. Once the process is in one of these states
it will never leave it again as they are both absorbing states.
This fact corresponds to the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993), and others before
introducing mutations. With pure best-response behavior either state where the whole
population plays one of the two strict Nash equilibria is an absorbing state. Only after the
noise component is added does a selection between these states occur. In our model, as we
will see, a selection already occurs on the basis of stochastic strategy adjustment.
7In this sense the parameter works in a similar way as the inertia parameter µ in the learning model of
Hart and Mas-Colell (1997).
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Certainly also every convex combination of νB and νT is invariant as in general the set
of invariant distributions is a compact convex set. So the question is if any other extreme
invariant distribution ν exists for the process besides νB and νT . The answer is given in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The only extremal invariant distributions of the adjustment process {ξt}t≥0
are νB and νT , that concentrate on B and T, respectively.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
Let µ be a probability measure on Ξ. Let {ξµt }t≥0 be the adjustment process that starts
with initial distribution µ and let µt denote the distribution of that process at time t. An
immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that if limt→∞ µt exists, the process clusters,
that is for any x, y ∈ Zn the probability of the event {ξµt (x) 6= ξµt (y)} converges to 0 as t
goes to infinity. In other words, if the process converges in distribution it must hold that
all agents coordinate on one of the two strict Nash equilibria.
Corollary 1 If the adjustment process converges all agents coordinate on one of the two
Nash equilibria.
The next question is: which equilibrium are agents more likely to coordinate on? Or,
which initial distributions will lead agents to the risk-dominant equilibrium? The answer
to this question will give the desired selection result.
9. Coordination on the Risk-Dominant Equilibrium
Note that invariant distributions of the adjustment process are translation invariant, where
the latter is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A probability measure µ on Ξ is translation invariant if for any finite col-
lection of agents (x1, . . . , xk), any profile of strategies (i1, . . . , ik), with ij ∈ {T,B}, and
z ∈ Zn
µ
(
ξ(z + x1) = i1, . . . , ξ(z + xk) = ik
)
= µ
(
ξ(x1) = i1, . . . , ξ(xk) = ik
)
, (11)
i.e. probabilities do not depend on z.
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Since the dynamics of the adjustment process are translation invariant as well, in the
sense that the assumed behavior is the same for every agent x ∈ Zn, this suggests that the
property of translation invariance plays an important role in the model. The next result
fully characterizes convergence of play given that it starts with a translation invariant
distribution.
Proposition 3 Let the initial distribution µ be translation invariant. Then
lim
t→∞µt = ανB + (1− α)νT , (12)
where α = µ(B).
Proof. See appendix.
Equation (12) nicely states the long-run effects of the interaction in our model. In
general, any limiting distribution must be a convex combination of the two measures νB
and νT . Now for a translation invariant distribution µ the parameter α that determines the
mixture between these measures is already uniquely determined by the value µ(B), which
is the probability that all agents start playing strategy B. Once this probability is zero we
obtain almost-sure convergence to νT . On the other hand, almost-sure convergence to νB
is obtained only in case the process already starts in that particular state, i.e. µ(B) = 1.
We thus have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the initial distribution of the process is translation invariant and with prob-
ability zero all agents play strategy B initially, then agents coordinate on the risk-dominant
equilibrium with probability one.
As an example of Corollary 2 consider the process that starts with the Bernoulli product-
measure µ as initial distribution, i.e. for each agent x ∈ Zn, µ(ξ(x) = T ) = , with
0 ≤  ≤ 1. Clearly µ is translation invariant. If  > 0, µ(B) = 0, hence agents will
coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. While the state of the population at the
beginning is characterized by individual independence, in the long run the evolution of
the process in time eventually leads to complete unanimity. More than that, all players
eventually agree to coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. The driving force that
makes this coordination possible is the adjustment mechanism determined by the interaction
between players. Even though this interaction is locally restricted to the neighborhood of
an agent, its effect is on the population as a whole, because of the considerable overlap
between these neighborhoods.
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Remark. The above result is a direct implication of a − d > b − c, i.e. strategy T being
risk dominant. Denote κ = a−d
b−c the ratio of these terms, measuring the degree of risk
dominance. An important effect of κ approaching 1, i.e. both equilibria becoming equally
risky, is that the expected waiting time for the process to hit any absorbing state, either T
or B, gets very high. This result is due to Cox (1989) and holds for finite populations where,
contrary to the infinite case, the probability to hit an absorbing state in finite time equals
1. Consider, for example, a finite population X of agents located on the torus imbedded
in the 2-dimensional lattice Z2. Let the initial distribution of play be given by the finite
version of the Bernoulli product-measure µ with  > 0. Then, as κ approaches 1, the
expected waiting time to hit any equilibrium state tends to
2
pi
|X|2 log |X|(− log − (1− ) log(1− )) (13)
as |X| becomes large.8 See Cox (1989) for further reference. Thus, when both equilibria
are equally risky and the population is large but finite, stochastic strategy adjustment
requires very long waiting times until the whole population coordinates on either of the
Nash equilibria, even though interaction is restricted to local neighborhoods.
10. Spread of Risk-Dominant Play
So far results have been obtained for the case where the initial state of the population may
be described by a translation invariant distribution. We now describe how risk-dominant
play spreads, starting from an arbitrary set of agents playing strategy T at time zero.
This reveals a particular advantage of any spatial model compared to the models of KMR
(1993) and Young (1993), where the population is not endowed with a spatial structure
and hence, the actual spread of a strategy can not be analyzed. Let A ⊂ Zn denote the
set of agents playing T at time zero. Obviously, a spread of risk-dominant play can occur
only if the absorbing state B, where all agents play B, is never reached. Let {ξAt }t≥0 be
the adjustment process that starts with all agents x ∈ A playing strategy T and all others
playing strategy B. Let τA denote the hitting time of the state B for the process {ξAt }t≥0.
The next proposition calculates the probability for the process to reach this state in finite
time.
8The order of limits in this statement is first κ ↓ 1 and then |X| ↑ ∞.
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Proposition 4 Let A ⊂ Zn. Then
Prob[τA <∞] =
 κ−|A| if A finite0 if A infinite, (14)
where κ = a−d
b−c .
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition shows that the probability to hit the absorbing state B in finite time
depends on the number of agents that play T at the beginning and the ratio of individual
weights of adjustment κ = a−d
b−d . Since T is risk dominant this ratio is always larger than
1. So the probability decreases exponentially as the number of initial T -strategists grows.
Note that the probability does not depend on the spatial spread of A, i.e. how densely
these agents are actually distributed within the population. The only thing that matters is
the cardinality of A. In particular, if A is infinite, we again obtain almost sure coordination
on the risk-dominant equilibrium.
In (14), the degree of risk dominance, expressed by κ, directly enters the equation. The
more risk dominant strategy T , the faster the probability of entering the state B decreases
as the size of A grows. In the other direction, as both equilibria become equally risky (i.e.
κ approaches 1) the probability of reaching the equilibrium where everybody plays B tends
to 1 for finite A.
Now suppose that strategy T is very risk dominant in the sense that κ  1. By
Proposition 4, for large A the event {τA = ∞} has overwhelming probability. Denote
Dr = {x ∈ Zn : |x| ≤ r} the ball of radius r around the origin and let χ(ξAt ) ⊂ Zn be the
set of agents that play strategy T given configuration ξAt . The next proposition, which is
due to Bramson and Griffeath (1981), shows that, conditioned on {τA = ∞}, strategy T
eventually spreads at least linearly. Thus again if A is infinite, risk-dominant play almost
surely overtakes the whole population in a linear fashion.
Proposition 5 There exists a constant β > 0 such that for every set A 6= ∅ of agents
playing strategy T at time zero,
Prob[∃t0 <∞ ∀t ≥ t0 Dβt ⊂ χ(ξAt )| τA =∞] = 1. (15)
Since the proof of Proposition 5 is long and very technical and, moreover, fully given
in Bramson and Griffeath (1981, Theorem 1), the reader is referred to their article. Their
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proof also shows that the constant β depends only on the dimension n and the parameter
κ.
It is instructive to compare the result to a similar one in the equilibrium selection model
of Hofbauer (1998). There the author examines a travelling wave approach to define a spa-
tially dominant equilibrium that is shown to coincide with risk dominance in symmetric 2×2
coordination games. A notable observation is that the speed of this wave is closely related
to the asymptotic growth of the set of T -players in the present model of stochastic strat-
egy adjustment. Consider, for example the simple coordination game with off-equilibrium
payoffs c and d equal to zero. Then it can be shown that the asymptotic speed of a spread
of T under the adjustment process is equal to 1
4n
√
n
a−b
a+b
[Bramson and Griffeath (1981)].
The wave speed in Hofbauer (1998) using replicator dynamics as reaction dynamics equals√
e
2
a−b√
a+b
, where e captures an additional migration rate of agents. In Hofbauer’s model the
population is distributed on the one-dimensional line IR. Hence, taking the same dimension
n = 1, risk-dominant play spreads at a similar speed in the present model as in Hofbauer’s.
At the same time the underlying geometric structure of the population is, of course, sub-
stantially different. This suggests that the result in Proposition 5 does not depend on the
special structure of the space Zn as one might, perhaps, have suspected.
11. Conclusion
In this model we study a new form of strategy adjustment behavior by agents repeatedly
playing a symmetric 2×2 coordination game with local neighbors. Rather than considering
perturbations of pure best-response we focus on the original idea of best-response, which
says that agents are influenced by payoff differences. We smooth this influence by assuming
that, instead of switching to best responses with probability one, agents switch to better
responses with higher probability. The underlying idea of this assumption corresponds to
the bounded rationality model of Rosenthal (1989) and the notion of proportional imitation
of Schlag (1998). Based on a spatial model of local interaction our findings show that agents
are more likely to coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. In this sense our approach
supports the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993), and others. In fact, in our model risk-
dominant play prevails with probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely
many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents. This is obtained, e.g.,
by starting either with a corresponding Dirac measure or with independent probability
assignments to each agent, where strategy T has at least some positive probability.
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Our study shares with others the special feature that agents do not have the opportunity
to influence the set of opponents they face. Every agent interacts with a local neighborhood
that is exogenously given and remains fixed forever. In contrast, Ely (1995) and Bhaskar
and Vega-Redondo (1997) have shown that once agents are allowed to choose their set of
opponents the situation looks very different. They introduce a number of available locations
where agents can meet and exclusively play the game with each other. Thus the choice of a
location directly determines the set of opponents an agent is going to face. The effect is that
agents no longer coordinate on the risk-dominant but instead choose the payoff-dominant
equilibrium.9
This suggests that results on equilibrium selection do not only depend upon the
characteristics of the noise process or the considered adjustment behavior of an agent
but also, and perhaps even more, on the specific kind of interaction that is as-
sumed. In consequence, the next questions are: once interaction structures are mod-
elled endogenously, how do these structures evolve themselves? What are the mecha-
nisms that exist between playing specific strategies and interacting with specific neigh-
bors? How do these mechanisms work together? Do strategies perhaps arise as a di-
rect consequence of interaction patterns? Or, in other words, do interaction patterns
define the (local) environment in such a way that specific play can be observed that would
not be observed if the interaction patterns were different? Promising work in this direction
includes Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (1997), Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998), Morris
(2000), and Young (1998). It remains an important topic for future research.
9Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997) obtain the payoff-dominant equilibrium for stag-hunt games and
both equilibria for pure coordination games. See our footnote 3.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The key to Proposition 2 lies in the analysis of the dual process.10
For the adjustment process this process is a continuous time particle jump process on Zn
where each particle jumps with rate 2n(b − c) to a neighboring site and also produces
a particle in an unoccupied site with rate equal to 2n((a − d) − (b − c)). If a particle
attempts to occupy a site that is already occupied the two particles coalesce. Let {ηt}t≥0
denote this process. The result then follows from Theorem 1.6 in Schwartz (1977), who
shows that whenever the dual process of a Markov process on Ξ is monotone and fulfills
a certain growth condition, then any invariant distribution must be a convex combination
of the two distributions νB and νT . In our context a process is monotone if flip rates
are increasing functions in the number of neighbors that play the other strategy, which is
obviously fulfilled. The growth condition is as follows. Let ∆n denote the collection of finite
subsets A ⊂ Zn. Then,
∀A, A˜ ∈ ∆n, A 6= ∅ PˆA[A˜ ⊂ ηt for some t ≥ 0] = 1, (16)
where PˆA denotes the probability measure that governs the dual process starting with set
A.
To show that condition (16) holds, we couple the dual process with a recurrent Markov
chain {Xt}t≥0 on Zn such that Xt ∈ ηt, PˆA-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 (A 6= ∅), and use the fact
that for every x ∈ Zn and A˜ ∈ ∆n, Pˆ {x}[A˜ ⊂ ηt for some t ≥ 0] > 0. A standard Markov
argument then leads to (16). (Details are available upon request.) The Markov chain is
constructed as follows. Define X0 := x for some x ∈ A. Let Xt follow the random walk of
this particle in x until it produces a new particle in a neighboring site. If this new particle
is closer to zero than x, let Xt follow the random walk of this new particle, otherwise let
Xt proceed following the walk of the old one. Thus Xt has the following jump rates
y −→ z

at rate a− d if z ∈ N(y) ∧ ‖z‖ < ‖y‖,
at rate b− c if z ∈ N(y) ∧ ‖z‖ > ‖y‖,
(17)
where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidian norm on Zn. Clearly Xt ∈ ηt, PˆA-a.s. for any t ≥ 0, because
(Xt, t) follows a path in the space-time representation (ηt, t). Moreover, since {Xt}t≥0 is a
10See Liggett (1985), Chapter II on duality for particle systems.
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random walk with positive drift towards the origin, {Xt}t≥0 is also recurrent. This concludes
the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. The first observation is that d
dt
µt(ξ(x) = T ) is non-negative and
hence the probability of playing T at time t is non-decreasing in t. The time derivative is
calculated as follows:
d
dt
µt
(
ξ(x) = T
)
= (a− d) ∑
y∈N(x)
µt
(
ξ(x) = B, ξ(y) = T
)
− (b− c) ∑
y∈N(x)
µt
(
ξ(x) = T, ξ(y) = B
)
(18)
=
(
(a− d)− (b− c)
) ∑
y∈N(x)
µt
(
ξ(x) = B, ξ(y) = T
)
(19)
≥ 0.
Intuitively, the first term in (18) represents the ‘inflow’ of probability (caused by x playing
B and some neighbor playing T ), the second term represents the ‘outflow’ of probability
(caused by x playing T and some neighbor playing B). Since µ and hence also µt are
translation invariant, the second term can be rewritten and both terms can be summed
up. Because a − d > b − c, d
dt
µt(ξ(x) = T ) is non-negative. Hence µt is non-decreasing
and, being an element of [0, 1], must converge. Consequently, the process clusters. The fact
that α = µ(B) follows again from translation invariance of µ and µt, which implies that
µ(B) = µt(B). 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider first the case when A is finite. If tm denotes the time
of the m’th flip of ξAt , then R
A
m = |{x|ξAtm(x) = T}| is a random walk on IN, where
RAm −RAm−1 =
 1 with prob. p−1 with prob. 1− p, (20)
with p = κ
κ+1
and 1− p = 1
κ+1
. This follows from the flip rates of the adjustment process:
p
1−p =
a−d
b−c = κ. The fact that we can reduce the system to the indicated random process is
an implication of the following aggregation result. Let {x|ξ(x) = T} be finite, then
∑
{x|ξ(x)=T}
nB(x, ξ) =
∑
{y|ξ(y)=B}
nT (y, ξ). (21)
Since at any time the probability p depends on the set of agents playing B, {y|ξ(y) = B},
the number of T -neighbors of each of these agents, nT (y, ξ), and the weight a − d (and
analogously for 1− p), this establishes the relationship p
1−p =
a−d
b−c .
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For r ∈ IN define the waiting time W := minm≥0{RAm /∈ (0, r)}, i.e. the waiting time for
the first moment the random walk leaves the interval (0, r). By the lemma of Borel-Cantelli
it follows that W is almost surely finite. Because of the positive drift κ−1
κ+1
towards infinity,
RAm is not a martingale. Therefore define the function h(l) = (
1−p
p
)l. h(l) is a harmonic
function with respect to RAm, i.e. (Kh)(l) = h(l), where K(l, ·) denotes the transition
function of the random walk RAm. Now H
A
m = h(R
A
m) is in fact a martingale and since Hm∧S
is clearly bounded, by the martingale stopping theorem it follows that E[HS] = E[H0]. With
p0 and pr, denoting the probability for R
A
S to be 0 and r, respectively, this is equivalent to
p0h(0) + prh(r) = h(|A|) (22)
⇐⇒ p0
(
h(0)− h(r)
)
= h(|A|)− h(r) (23)
⇐⇒ p0 = h(|A|)− h(r)
h(0)− h(r) (24)
⇐⇒ p0 =
(1−p
p
)|A| − (1−p
p
)r
1− (1−p
p
)r
. (25)
Now let the interval (0, r) grow to infinity, then P [τA < ∞] = limr→∞ p0. Since the latter
limit is equal to (1−p
p
)|A| = κ−|A|, this proves the finite case.
The infinite case now follows from the finite one by exhausting the space Zn via a
sequence of finite boxes with increasing radius centred around the origin, using monotonicity
of the process. 2
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